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BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
TRADE. NAMEs
Alvin B. Rubin*
A commercial partnership was conducting the business of sell-
ing beverages at retail, for home consumption, and delivering the
beverages to the homes of the customers under the business name
of "Home Beverage Service." In Home Beverage Service v. Baas1
it sought to enjoin another firm from using the title "Victory Home
Beverage Service." The court found that the plaintiff's trade name
was merely descriptive of the service which it rendered. Therefore,
under quite settled principles,' the name was incapable of exclusive
appropriation by the plaintiff or by anyone else.
Failing in its contention that "Home" is a fanciful, arbitrary
and non-descriptive word, as applied to its service, plaintiff urged
that, even though the word was not capable of exclusive appropri-
ation as a word, "by long use of its trade name the name had ac-
quired what is referred to by the law writers as a secondary mean-
ing." But plaintiff correctly conceded "that where a complainant
depends upon the so-called secondary meaning of a trade name or
trade-mark claimed by him he must prove fraud and unfair com-
petition on the part of his rival in order to prevent the latter's use
of the trade name or trade-mark in contest."8  The court found
neither fraud nor unfair competition, and therefore no cause for
holding defendant liable for unfair competition.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Alvin B. Rubin*
In Davis v. Dees,' it was held that a sale of a business together
with its "good will" did not preclude the vendor from entering into
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1. 210 La. 878, 28 So. (2d) 481 (1946).
2. The court cited Dryice Corporation of America v. Louisiana Dry Ice
Corporation, 54 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 5th, 1982) ; Drive It Yourself Co. v. North,
148 Md. 609, 180 Atl. 57, 48 A. L. R. 206 (1925). See also, for example, Purity
Springs Water Co. v. Redwood Ice Delivery, 203 Cal, 286, 263 Pac. 810 (1928),
where "Purity" was held descriptive as applied to bottled spring water; Choynski
v. Cohen, 89 Cal. 501 (1870), where "Antiquarian" was held descriptive as ap-
plied to a bookstore. Compare 60 Stat. 428, Title I, § 2 (d) (1946), 15 U. S. C.A.
§ 1052 (d) (1946).
3. Barton v. Rex-Oil Co. Inc., 2 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924). See also
Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), appeal
dismissed 282 U.S. 813, 51 S. Ct. 214, 75 L. Ed. 728 (1980) ; American Medicinal
Spirits Co. v. United Distillers Limited, 76 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); G.
& C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 869, 877 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
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1. 211 La. 229, 29 So. (2d) 774 (1947).
